APPENDIX FOR "ELITE AND MASS SUPPORT FOR FOREIGN AID VERSUS GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM UGANDA"

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This appendix reports on design features as well as additional results not contained in the paper. All material here is referenced in the paper, but with more detail.

Design Details

Text of the Education Project

For the other project the question was: "The Post Primary Education and Training Adaptable Program Lending Project seeks to increase access to lower secondary education, improve the quality of lower secondary education, and enhance primary education and training. The project may require your community to providing funding for maintenance in the future. [This project will be funded by the {RANDOMLY ASSIGNED FUNDER}]. How much would you support this project?"

Text of the Petition

Dear Sir/Madam

I have learned about the Electricity Sector Development Project through participating in a survey project with **[University Name Redacted]**. I understand that this project will improve the reliability of and increase access to electricity and that one major aspect of the project is to extend electricity to those who do not yet have access to it. I am signing this letter to voice my [support/opposition] to this project's implementation in Uganda.

Signed:

_____ Date:_____

_____ Date:_____

Additional Statistical Results

Differences between treatment and control (graphically)

Figure A1a shows the differences in means between aid and government with the upper pane plotting raw means and the lower pane capturing the statistical difference between means for citizens and MPs. The results show some meaningful differences.

Figure A1a: MP and Citizen Support for Aid vs. Government Projects



Note: The upper pane displays the mean of subjects in the government vs. aid conditions, for both citizens and MPs, who supported the project. The first two bars in each column show the citizen results and the second two bars show the MP results. To capture the statistical difference between the two, the lower pane displays the difference between aid and the government (control) for citizens and MPs along with 95% confidence intervals surrounding the difference estimates. If the results were exactly as hypothesized, we should observe that the difference between aid and government for the citizens is always positive (the dots in the lower pane should always be above zero and 95% confidence intervals not crossing zero). Further, we should observe that the difference between aid and government for the MPs is always negative (the dots in the lower pane should always be below zero and 95% confident intervals not crossing zero).

Figure A1b shows the differences in means between aid and government for the combined dependent variable measures with the upper pane plotting raw means and the lower pane capturing the statistical difference between means for citizens and MPs. The results show some meaningful differences.

Figure A1b: MP and Citizen Support for Aid vs. Government Projects



Note: The upper pane displays the means for subjects in the government vs. aid conditions, for both citizens and MPs, who supported the project. The first two bars in each column show the citizen results and the second two bars show the MP results. To capture the statistical difference between the two, the lower pane displays the difference between aid and the government (control) for citizens and MPs along with 95% confidence intervals surrounding the difference estimates. If the results were exactly as hypothesized, we should observe that the difference between aid and government for the citizens is always positive (the dots in the lower pane should always be above zero and 95% confidence intervals not crossing zero). Further, we should observe that the difference between aid and government for the MPs is always negative (the dots in the lower pane should always be below zero and 95% confident intervals not crossing zero).

Probing Alternative Mechanisms

Foreign Media Effect

Mass respondents could be more likely to voice their support for a project when it is associated with a foreign donor rather than when it is a domestic source. Citizens and elites that prefer foreign media are more likely to be biased in favor of foreign projects because those projects are referenced favorably in the foreign media We thus separated masses and MPs by the extent to which they prefer foreign media over Ugandan media. See Figures A2 and A3 in appendix. The results generally are in consistent and weak. For the masses that do not prefer foreign media, there is a preference for foreign aid over government assistance, though the results are not consistently significant. The direction of this effect cuts against a foreign media effect hypothesis, moreover. MPs who do not prefer foreign media expressed more support for government assistance, but likewise the significance of the results is weak. For the masses preferring foreign media (Figure A3), there is again a preference for foreign aid. But again the results are not statistically strong. On the other hand, MPs that prefer foreign media express stronger support for government projects, and a number of these results are statistically significant, though in the opposite direction from what a media effect argument would predict. As an additional test of this mechanism, we also separated respondents into those who indicated that they had *heard* of at least two of the foreign donors used in the experiments (USAID, World Bank, etc.) and those who had not. We assume that prior knowledge of the donors that were used as treatment conditions is correlated with a stronger media effect for foreign donors. Importantly, we only asked these knowledge questions of voters, and can only text this mechanism among them, as we did not want to patronize the MPs by asking such question as "Have you heard of the World Bank". We find that citizens who had heard of at least two of the donors *were not* more likely to prefer foreign aid over government funds. These results are largely robust to using "only heard of one aid donor" as the cutoff point. The only change is that those who have heard of at least one donor are significantly more likely to sign a petition for an aid-funded project ($p < 0.05$).

Figure A2a: Difference in means tests for masses and MPs who do not prefer to watch foreign media. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that masses who prefer local media still support aid, though the results are not strong statistically. The results for MPs do not suggest any clear lessons.



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

Figure A3a: Difference in means tests for masses and MPs who prefer to watch foreign media. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that masses who prefer foreign media support aid, though the results are not strong statistically. The results for MPs suggest that those that prefer foreign media still support government assistance, contrary to expectations of a media effect argument.



Figure A3b: Difference in means tests for masses and MPs who prefer to watch foreign media. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that masses who prefer foreign media support aid, though the results are not strong statistically. The results for MPs suggest that those that prefer foreign media still support government assistance, contrary to expectations of a media effect argument.



Partisanship

Figure A4a: Difference in means tests for MPs and masses who do not belong to the ruling NRM party. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. Thus, for non-NRM members the masses appear to support foreign aid more than the MPs who appear to support government funding. The results are significant in a few cases, but not consistently across most conditions.



Figure A4b: Difference in means tests for MPs and masses who do not belong to the ruling NRM party. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. Thus, for non-NRM members the masses appear to support foreign aid more than the MPs who appear to support government funding. The results are significant in a few cases, but not consistently across most conditions.



Figure A5a: Difference in means tests for MPs and masses who do not belong to the ruling NRM party. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that NRM masses and MPs do not consistently support aid or government funding over each other.



Figure A5b: Difference in means tests for MPs and masses who do not belong to the ruling NRM party. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that NRM masses and MPs do not consistently support aid or government funding over each other.



Ethnicity

Figure A6a: Difference in means tests for MPs and masses who do not share the same ethnicity as President Museveni. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that non-coethnic masses support aid more than government, though the result is not statistically strong. Non-coethnic MPs support government funding more but likewise the result is not strong statistically.



Figure A6b: Difference in means tests for MPs and masses who do not share the same ethnicity as President Museveni. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that non-coethnic masses support aid more than government, though the result is not statistically strong. Non-coethnic MPs support government funding more but likewise the result is not strong statistically.



Figure A7a: Difference in means tests for MPs and masses who share the same ethnicity as President Museveni. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that coethnic masses and coethnic MPs have no strong preferences for foreign aid or government.



Figure A7b: Difference in means tests for MPs and masses who share the same ethnicity as President Museveni. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that coethnic masses and coethnic MPs have no strong preferences for foreign aid or government.



Nationalism

Figure A8a: Difference in means tests for MPs and masses who feel a stronger attachment to tribe than to a larger Ugandan nationality. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that non-nationalist masses prefer foreign aid over government funding, though the result is not consistently significant. The direction of the results for the non-nationalist MPs is opposite, but again the results are not consistently significant.



Figure A8b: Difference in means tests for MPs and masses who feel a stronger attachment to tribe than to a larger Ugandan nationality. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that non-nationalist masses prefer foreign aid over government funding, though the result is not consistently significant. The direction of the results for the non-nationalist MPs is opposite, but again the results are not consistently significant.



Figure A9a: Difference in means tests for MPs and masses who feel a stronger attachment to a larger Ugandan nationality than to their own tribe. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that neither nationalist masses nor MPs have strong preferences for aid or government funds.



Figure A9b: Difference in means tests for MPs and masses who feel a stronger attachment to a larger Ugandan nationality than to their own tribe. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that neither nationalist masses nor MPs have strong preferences for aid or government funds.



Incumbency Bias

Figure A10a: Difference in means tests for former MPs. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that former MPs have no strong preferences for aid over government or vie versa.



Figure A10b: Difference in means tests for former MPs. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that former MPs have no strong preferences for aid over government or vie versa.



Figure A11a: Difference in means tests for current MPs. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that current MPs prefer government funds over aid, though the result is only significant in one condition.



Figure A11b: Difference in means tests for current MPs. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that current MPs prefer government funds over aid, though the result is only significant in one condition.



Corruption and Clientelism

Figure A12a: Difference in means tests for masses and MPs who do not perceive corruption or clientelism in the government. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that neither masses nor MPs have strong preferences when they do not perceive corruption or clientelism in the government.



Figure A12b: Difference in means tests for masses and MPs who do not perceive corruption or clientelism in the government. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that neither masses nor MPs have strong preferences when they do not perceive corruption or clientelism in the government.



Figure A13a: Difference in means tests for masses and MPs who perceive corruption or clientelism in the government. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that masses have strong preferences for foreign aid when they perceive corruption and those results are largely significant across conditions. MPs who perceive corruption, on the other hand, prefer government funds over aid, a result that is significant in five of the nine conditions.



Figure A13b: Difference in means tests for masses and MPs who perceive corruption or clientelism in the government. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that masses have strong preferences for foreign aid when they perceive corruption and those results are largely significant across conditions. MPs who perceive corruption, on the other hand, prefer government funds over aid, a result that is significant in five of the nine conditions.



Robustness Tests

Donor Differences

As discussed in the paper, in addition to testing the treatment effect of receiving an aid donor relative to the government control, we also tested the effect of individual donors across groups. Because elites did not receive the African Development Bank and Government of China treatments, we estimated difference in means tests to detect the effect of the various treatments relative to the control and the other treatment conditions. Across all groups, there is never a consistently significant effect for any of the individual donors. The results for comparisons of the US to other donors are displayed in Tables A1 and A2 below.

Table A1a: Masses Results for Differences Between US and Other Donors

Dep. Variable	Comparison	Mean 1st Donor	Mean 2nd Donor	T stat on difference
Strong Support	US vs. not US	0.786	0.761	1.296
	US vs. Bilat		0.748	1.463
	US vs. Multilat		0.757	1.101
	US vs. Control		0.735	1.944
	US vs. WB		0.759	1.019
Tell Support	US vs. not US	0.948	0.934	1.334
	US vs. Bilat		0.949	-0.022
	US vs. Multilat		0.938	0.681
	US vs. Control		0.910	2.410
	US vs. WB		0.947	0.098
Willing to Sign	US vs. not US	0.825	0.830	-0.238
	US vs. Bilat		0.836	-0.445
	US vs. Multilat		0.828	-0.097
	US vs. Control		0.816	0.386
	US vs. WB		0.833	-0.312
Sign Petition	US vs. not US	0.793	0.798	-0.255
	US vs. Bilat		0.813	-0.815
	US vs. Multilat		0.800	-0.264
	US vs. Control		0.766	1.061
	US vs. WB		0.797	-0.175
Willing to SMS	US vs. not US	0.643	0.626	0.721
	US vs. Bilat		0.644	-0.047
	US vs. Multilat		0.623	0.664
	US vs. Control		0.591	1.717
	US vs. WB		0.631	0.384
Send SMS	US vs. not US	0.049	0.029	1.956
	US vs. Bilat		0.029	1.625
	US vs. Multilat		0.021	2.390
	US vs. Control		0.019	2.706
	US vs. WB		0.038	0.837

Table A1b: Masses Results for Differences Between US and Other Donors with Aggregated Dependent Variable Measures

Dep. Variable	Comparison	Mean 1st Donor	Mean 2nd Donor	T stat on difference
DV sum	US vs. not US	4.020	3.950	0.962
	US vs. Bilat		3.994	0.276
	US vs. Multilat		3.936	0.895
	US vs. Control		3.777	2.509
	US vs. WB		3.994	0.276
Alt. DV additive	US vs. not US	5.876	5.783	0.972
	US vs. Bilat		5.849	0.222
	US vs. Multilat		5.785	0.736
	US vs. Control		5.613	2.044
	US vs. WB		5.806	0.557
Alt. DV balance	US vs. not US	2.359	2.227	0.949
	US vs. Bilat		2.292	0.379
	US vs. Multilat		2.204	0.858
	US vs. Control		1.939	2.275
	US vs. WB		2.304	0.305

Table A2a: MP Results for Differences Between US and Other Donors

Dep. Variable	Comparison	Mean 1st Donor	Mean 2nd Donor	T stat on difference
Strong Support	US vs. not US	0.830	0.829	0.028
	US vs. Bilat		0.879	-1.178
	US vs. Multilat		0.809	0.455
	US vs. Control		0.838	-0.186
	US vs. WB		0.790	0.871
Tell Support	US vs. not US	0.987	0.982	0.472
	US vs. Bilat		0.993	-0.509
	US vs. Multilat		0.985	0.155
	US vs. Control		0.971	0.949
	US vs. WB		0.979	0.522
Willing to Sign	US vs. not US	0.784	0.851	-1.817
	US vs. Bilat		0.886	-2.363
	US vs. Multilat		0.824	-0.850
	US vs. Control		0.890	-2.457
	US vs. WB		0.804	-0.422
Sign Petition	US vs. not US	0.739	0.759	-0.500
	US vs. Bilat		0.773	-0.687
	US vs. Multilat		0.742	-0.074
	US vs. Control		0.783	-0.879
	US vs. WB		0.736	0.048
Coordinate Peer	US vs. not US	0.987	0.971	1.372
	US vs. Bilat		0.964	1.242
	US vs. Multilat		0.977	0.613
	US vs. Control		0.993	-0.485
	US vs. WB		0.951	1.766
Petition Pres	US vs. not US	0.6	0.717	-1.861
	US vs. Bilat		0.743	-1.843
	US vs. Multilat		0.658	-0.744
	US vs. Control		0.746	-1.806
	US vs. WB		0.735	-1.726

Table A2b: MP Results for Differences Between US and Other Donors with Aggregated Dependent Variables

Dep. Variable	Comparison	Mean 1st Donor	Mean 2nd Donor	T stat on difference
DV sum	US vs. not US	6.758	6.950	-1.200
	US vs. Bilat		7.099	-1.679
	US vs. Multilat		6.970	-0.984
	US vs. Control		6.949	-0.939
	US vs. WB		6.785	-0.123
Alt. DV additive	US vs. not US	9.906	10.351	-1.172
	US vs. Bilat		10.726	-1.849
	US vs. Multilat		9.841	0.132
	US vs. Control		10.600	-1.525
	US vs. WB		10.344	-0.893
Alt. DV balance	US vs. not US	6.098	6.373	-1.147
	US vs. Bilat		6.631	-1.791
	US vs. Multilat		6.333	-0.739
	US vs. Control		6.435	-1.129
	US vs. WB		6.097	0.003

Mediation Analysis

It is possible that clientelism could work through shared ethnicity with the president, region identities (if patronage-client ties are region-specific), or through partisanship networks. We test here whether or not the study's results regarding the role of clientelism are mediated by these three variables. To do so, we employ the mediation analysis proposed by Imai et al (2011) because it provides more appropriate assumptions than the traditional structural model approach to mediation analysis.

Imai et al's mediation analysis (1) models the mediator as a function of the treatment variable and pre-treatment covariates and (2) models the outcome as a function of the treatment, the mediator, and the pre-treatment controls (Imai et al 2011). The mediator model is used to predict two values of the mediator for each observation: one under treatment and another under control. The outcomes model is used to predict potential outcomes under treatment and control. Finally, Monte Carlo simulations (1000 simulations) are used to estimate the statistical certainty of the predicted average causal mediation effect (ACME).

The mediation analysis relies on two separate ignorability assumptions; what the authors call, sequential ignorability. First, we must assume that, given pre-treatment confounders, treatment assignment is statistically independent of potential mediators. Second, we must assume that the observed mediators are "ignorable given the actual treatment status and pretreatment confounders" (Imai et al 2011, 770).

The mediation analysis returns three quantities of interest. It estimates (1) the mediation effect, or the effect of the mediator on the outcome of interest, (2) the direct effect or the effect of the treatment on the outcome that does not flow through the

mediator, and (3) the total effect which is the sum of the previous two effects. These values are plotted in Figures A14 and A15. Figure A14 reports the mediation analysis for the mass sample. We conduct mediation analysis for each of the three variables on the sub-samples of those who do and do not perceive clientelism in government. Figure A15 reports the mediation analysis for the MPs. The ACME is the key outcome of interest: if this point estimate is significantly different from zero, then we have evidence that preferences for funding sources are mediated by the mechanisms of interest. However, for both the masses and the MPs, none of these three variables has a significant mediating effect.

Figure A14: Mediation Analysis for the Masses



Figure A15: Mediation Analysis for the MPs



Table A3a: Results for Masses Subjects Familiar with Donors

	Strong support			Tell Support			Willing to Sign Petitin			Signed Petition			Will. To SMS		
Subgroup	**Aid**	**Gov't**	**Diff.**	**Aid**	**Gov't**	**Diff.**	**Aid**	**Gov't**	**Diff.**	**Aid**	**Gov't**	**Diff.**	**Aid**	**Gov't**	**Dif**
Heard >= 2 Donors															
Subgroup N	1638	279		1625	276		1639	279		1646	283		1646	283	
N Outcome=1	1353	218		1543	260		1434	241		1407	232		1183	201	
Proportion	0.83	0.78	0.04*	0.95	0.94	0.01	0.87	0.86	0.01	0.85	0.82	0.04	0.72	0.71	0.0
Heard < 2 Donors															
Subgroup N	1369	249		1342	244		1369	249		1371	255		1371	255	
N Outcome=1	961	170		1247	213		1067	190		1015	180		733	117	
Proportion	0.70	0.68	0.02	0.93	0.87	0.06**	0.78	0.76	0.02	0.74	0.71	0.03	0.53	0.46	0.0

Statistical significance indicated as follows: *** p <0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10. All tests of statistical significance are two-tailed

Table A3b: Results for Masses Subjects Familiar with Donors

	DV sum			Alt. DV additive			Alt. DV balanc		
Subgroup	**Aid**	**Gov't**	**Diff.**	**Aid**	**Gov't**	**Diff.**	**Aid**	**Gov't**	**Diff.**
Heard >= 2 Donors									
Subgroup N	1646	283		1624	276		1646	283	
Mean	4.25	4.10	0.15	6.14	6.00	0.13	2.73	2.48	0.24
Heard < 2 Donors									
Subgroup N	1371	255		1342	244		1371	255	
Mean	3.68	3.42	0.27**	5.45	5.17	0.28*	1.79	1.33	0.46**

Statistical significance indicated as follows: *** p <0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10. All tests of statistical significance are two-tailed